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PRICE COMPETITION ANALYSIS IN ICT BUSINESS 
Angelou, Georgios, University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece, gangelou@tee.gr, 
Economides, Anastasios, University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece, economid@uom.gr 
Abstract  
The information and communication technology (ICT) industry is one of the most capital intensive among 
the high-technology industries. ICT business analysis, especially after the industry deregulation, has become 
a difficult task. This study integrates Real Options and Game Theory perspectives and examines multi-
period price competition in order to find the optimal ICT business strategy in terms of the time entry in the 
market and the service price. The analysis focuses on e-learning business activities showing how it can be 
formulated in the specific field.   
Keywords: Information and Communication Technologies, Price competition, Decision-making, E-learning, 
Real options, Game theory 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The valuation of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) investments is a challenging task since 
it is characterized by rapidly changing business and technology conditions. Especially, after the 
liberalization of the ICT markets, the related business activities are not owned exclusively by a single firm 
but rather are shared by many competitors. Examples of ICT markets with a limited number of players are 
operating systems developers (eg. Microsoft, Apple, Sun, and Linux), CPUs (eg. Intel, Sun) and mobile 
phones manufactures (e.g. Nokia, Siemens, Motorola and Ericsson). Furthermore, most countries issued a 
limited number of licenses for Mobile Telecommunication Operators. So in every country, there are only a 
few mobile telecommunication operators. The main challenge for a potential provider (investor) is to roll 
out its business activity at the right time and the right attributes. The entry time depends on ICT services 
penetration, network infrastructure cost, area characteristics, applications offered, expected tariff 
evolution, customers’ willingness to pay, demand forecasts, evolution of expected market shares and 
investor’s technical skills. Traditional finance theory suggests that firms should use a Discounted Cash Flow 
(DCF) methodology to analyze capital allocation requests. However, this approach does not properly 
account for the flexibility inherent in most ICT investment decisions. For example, an ICT infrastructure 
project may have a negative Net Present Value (NPV) when evaluated on a stand-alone basis, but may also 
provide the option to launch future value-added services if business conditions are favorable. Real Options 
(ROs) analysis presents an alternative method since it considers the managerial flexibility of responding to a 
change or new situation in business conditions (Trigeorgis 1996).  
This study focuses on the e-learning services business field. However, it can be easily extended to other ICT 
fields. E-learning is the delivery and management of learning by electronic means. Various devices 
(workstations, portable computers, handheld devices, smart phones, etc.), networks (wireline, wireless, 
satellite, etc.) can be used to support e-learning (Wentling et al. 2000). E-learning may incorporate 
synchronous or asynchronous communication, multiple senders and receivers (one-to-one, one-to-many, 
many –to many, etc.), multiple media and format independently of space and time. Recently the e-learning 
markets have been expanding very rapidly (Newman & Couturier 2002) and the potential investors face the 
dilemma of selecting the time to enter the market, the characteristics as well as the price of the offered 
service. This study treats these opportunities using option thinking and applies game theory to model the 
competition. It adopts price competition for modeling the competitive conditions. The interest investor 
faces one dilemma: “should he wait for understanding even better the overall business and control some of 
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its uncertainties, such as customers demand and business experience, or he should act rapidly and enter 
immediately the market? Furthermore, what is the optimum price to offer his services?”  
Previous research on e-learning cost analysis and investment evaluation has not considered the managerial 
flexibility of acting according to changing business conditions (Whalen and Wright 1999, Downes 1998, 
Morgan 2000). Few exceptions of e-learning investment analysis using ROs include Angelou and 
Economides (2007) and Oslignton (2004) works. In addition, price competition modelling in a general 
perspective of the information technology field was considered by Zhu (1999) and Zhu and Wyeant (2003). 
The present study extends these works by applying multi-period price competition under a ROs 
perspective. In addition, it applies the proposed analysis to e-learning services provision focusing on 
specific market characteristics. Previous research on investment evaluation has applied ROs to ICT, 
pharmaceuticals and petroleum fields (Angelou and Economides 2009, 2008a, 2008b, Iatropoulos et al., 
2004, Mun 2002, Mun 2003). For a survey of options theory applications in the ICT field, the interest reader 
is referred to Angelou and Economides (2005).  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses arguments for price and quantity competition 
modeling, which motivate our analysis. Section 3 describes the model and the proposed analysis. Section 4 
discusses a case study. Section 5 discusses the proposed analysis and suggests future work. Finally, section 
6 concludes the paper. 
2 ICT PRICE OR QUANTITY COMPETITION MODELLING  
The industrial organization literature has investigated various circumstances under which each type of 
competition is more likely to occur. In the airlines’ industry, where fixed costs are all paid before sales take 
place and the firms have capacity to fill many more orders than they may get, price competition is likely to 
occur. In other cases, where the production process takes a long time, firms may commit themselves to 
some level of output, and then sell it for what they can get. In these cases, competition is in quantities. 
Such case might be the dark fiber infrastructure installation in broadband technology field or infrastructure 
installation for e-learning services provision, while the quantity might be the geographical coverage or the 
number of customers’ connections fiber to the home (FTTH). One firm's temptation to undercut its rival's 
price and capture all the market, which underlies Bertrand's model, is present only when that firm has the 
capacity to serve the whole market. To see this, assume that two firms are in a Cournot equilibrium. Now 
also assume that both firms' plants are operating at full capacity (i.e. they cannot produce any larger 
output). Under these circumstances, there is no reason to cut price, since output cannot be increased 
beyond its present level by either firm. The firms will have the ultimate equilibrium in mind when planning 
how much capacity to install in the first place. Having built their plants, they then compete with each other 
to sell their outputs. When the firms decide on their own best capacity, they know whether the subsequent 
competition will be in prices (Bertrand) or quantities (Cournot). Under these circumstances, profit-
maximizing firms (telecommunications investors) should build networks just big enough to supply the 
output that could occur in Cournot equilibrium. Then, whether they subsequently compete by deciding on 
quantities (as in Cournot's theory) or on prices (as in Bertrand's theory) they end up in Cournot's 
equilibrium. They cover their total costs and make profits that are less than the profits in a monopoly but 
more than in a perfectly competitive industry. When they do reach the Cournot equilibrium, they are not 
tempted to cut prices because they are already producing at full capacity. The intuitive reason for this 
result is as follows. Firms often recognize the self-destructive nature of the price competition that was 
analyzed by Bertrand. Having recognized it, they take steps to avoid it. They do this by limiting their 
capacity to produce. This argument leads us to expect Cournot's results when demand is such that firms 
can just use their capacity, and Bertrand's results when firms unexpectedly (or, as in the case of aircrafts’ 
airlines, unavoidably) find themselves with large quantities of unused capacity. Thus, for example, when 
demand falls to unexpectedly low levels during a recession, firms will have excess capacity and will be 
tempted to engage in price competition that may drive price below average total cost. But when demand is 
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at its expected level, the firms will not find themselves with the excess capacity that tempts them to 
undercut their competitors, driving price below Cournot's equilibrium level. This is no accident; firms could 
have planned it that way. 
3 THE PROPOSED MODEL 
As mentioned before this study focuses on e-learning service considering price competition. Particularly, 
firms choose products and services with specific attributes and quality to offer to the customers. The firms 
choose prices and offer services to the consumers who choose whether or not to buy services based on 
these prices; consumption takes place and profits are realized. Hence, the firms choose the quality and the 
price of the products/services offered and the customers choose the quantities. Particularly, the following 
game is to be analyzed. Two identical firms (players) may enter the e-learning business field. The target is 
to find the overall business equilibrium for the two players considering price competition modelling. It is 
assumed that both players are rational and have access to the same amount of business related 
information. 
In appendix the analysis focuses on one-period game, estimating the equilibrium strategies of the firms. 
However, ICT business opportunities usually last more than a single period. This study assumes that the 
investment remains valid for two periods. All the notations used in the analysis are given in Table A-1 of 
Appendix. The possible decisions, for the duopoly case, for each player are the following: invest for high 
quality (INiHQL), invest for low quality (INiLQL), defer investment (DFiLQL) for low quality, (DFiHQL) for high 
quality, and abandon (A). We consider a binomial process for customer demand (D), where up and dn are 
the changes up to upD or down to dnD according to a binomial process, Figure 1. Especially, up and dn are 
the multiplicative binomial parameters (up>1, dn<1).   
                                     
Figure 1. Uncertain demand as binomial process 
We use the backwards induction process to determine the sub-game perfect equilibrium and then use the 
dynamic programming technique to bring back the values from period t (here t=2) to period t-1. Finally, 
when having these values for each period, both firms choose the equilibrium strategies. The same rule 
applies repeatedly for more than two periods. Concerning a multi-period perspective, dynamic 
programming and backward induction techniques solve the multiple period game. Particularly, the value of 
the business can be represented by the “Bellman” equation:  
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where V(x) is the value of the business, x is the state variable (here market demand D). I is the investment 
cost, π is the expected revenues under the condition that the investment has been implemented and r is 
the discount factor. Finally, V(x’) is the continuation value of the business conditional on the current state 
variable (demand D). Analytically, the first term represents the value of the exercised RO, while the second 
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term represents the value of continuation (i.e., holding the RO). In each period, each firm (player) compares 
these two terms, taking also into account the action of its competitor. Concerning the two-period case, the 
ROs to enter the specific business field remain available for two periods. We use the backwards induction 
method to find the game equilibrium. Assuming that the game has only one period left, then the single 
period results are valid. If the game has two periods left, then each firm (competitors) has to compare the 
payoffs from each of the possible decision combinations. Particularly, the second period game has to start 
from one of the following decision combinations: (INAHQL, INBHQL), (INAHQL, INBLQL), (INALQL, INBLQL), (INALQL, 
INBHQL), (INAHQL, DFB), (INALQL, DFB), (DFA, INBHQL), (DFA, INBLQL) and (DFA, DFB). Taking into account the one 
period analysis, given in Appendix, (IN, DF) and (DF, IN) are mixed strategies in the demand region 2 (see 
Figure A-1). When (IN, IN) set of decisions takes places the game is over and the decisions have been taken 
place. Hence, we only need to analyze the decision combinations (DF,DF). Analytically, if the game reaches 
to the decision combination (DF,DF) in the second period, we can use the one-period analysis as the 
restarting point adopting the ROs perspective. If the investment decision is to invest immediately at t=0 the 
overall business value is given by the Net Present Value (NPV) without any Real Options Value (ROV). On 
the other hand, if the decision is to defer up to t=T the overall value is given by the Expanded NPV, which 
actually contains the ROV (Trigeorgis 1996). All the decision alternatives for a two-period business game, 
for a duopoly case, are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Game choices and investment payoff matrix for a duopoly case 
The expected Expanded Net Present Value (ENPV) for the (DF,DF) strategies that contains the ROV to wait 
for high and low quality firm are given by equation 1 and 2 respectively:   
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Finally, in case of monopoly conditions, the case where one player invests while the other abandons the 
investment the ENPV (ROV) is given by expressions 3.   
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In order to estimate the ENPV for waiting strategies, we divide the demand spectrum into four zones as 
given below by equations 4 and 5 for low and high quality firms respectively.  
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In each zone for low and high quality firm, we compare ENPV when both players defer investment with NPV 
when both invest immediately at t=0. The target is to estimate the market demand level where waiting 
instead of investing is more profitable. We present our analysis for high quality firm, while it is similar for 
low quality firm.  In zone H1, demand is so low that the value of investment is zero for both cases. Thus in 
zone 1 the strategy is to wait. In zone H2 the waiting as seen is better that investing, as the later gives 0. In 
zone H3 the ENPVDFDF is given by equation 6.  
yimmediatel investing if                               , 0I
k82
hN
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k82
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q
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0
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
                                                    (6) 
Waiting will be more profitable than investing if ENPV(wait) – NPV(invest) >0. It is easy to show that this 
equation is met. Hence, in the zone H3 waiting is more profitable than investing immediately.  
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Finally, in zone H4 investment provides higher value if the firm invests immediately than waits. Hence, the 
equilibrium will be (DF, DF) if demand is below the value  82
1
N 2
42 kI
d
h  , (IN, IN) if demand is above this 
level. Hence, the threshold of demand between waiting and investing is given by equation 8.  
2
ΔΤσ
22
42 kI82 ekI82ukI82
d
1
hN                                                                               (8) 
The same applies for the low quality case. We assume that ΔΤσeu and ΔΤ-σed  (Trigeorgis, 1996). The 
investment threshold is a function of the uncertainty (here, measured by the volatility) of the market 
demand, the coefficient of the development cost and the overall investment infrastructure (one time) cost. 
The competitors will choose to wait more if the market demand is more volatile, and the infrastructure 
implementation costs more. Particularly, the uncertainty of the market demand increases the ROV and 
provides arguments for waiting more. As it can be seen in Appendix, in case of the price competition the 
competitor with the best quality attribute is able to charge higher prices and so experience higher 
revenues. From (8) we can see that the investment threshold of the two period game is higher than the 
threshold of the one period game. The conclusion is that the size of the investment cost (one time – sunk 
cost) as well the market size (number and type of consumers) are key factors to the entry decision and so 
the investment equilibrium. Also, the afore-mentioned discussion and results for a two-period game show 
the precise conditions under which competitors will enter the market. In Figure 2, we present the two 
dimensions of the customers demand domain. Under full symmetry among players, the demand thresholds 
are the same for both players. It may be subject of further work to adopt business asymmetries between 
players as a more realistic case.  
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Figure 2. Game equilibrium for symmetrical players. 
4 A CASE STUDY ANALYSIS  
To illustrate the proposed analysis we apply it to a hypothetical organization such as a public university 
(PU). PU is interested in entering in entering into the e-learning business field and exploiting its high 
experience in typical upper level education. The PU examines the possibility of setting up a subsidiary 
company named “PU e-services” and entering the e-business field. The analysis is based on the Mantzari 
and Economides (2004) case study. They examined a business activity to establish an enterprise which will 
offer services for learning foreign languages through the World Wide Web. The customers will be students 
and adults having access to the Internet. The base scale investment concerns learning English. Quality 
attributes may concern English for specific purposes such as business, technical, medicine, literature.  It 
may also concern similar services for other foreign languages. The courses are developed digitally on a 
special educational software platform that is purchased to cover the needs of the “PU e-services” company 
and it is installed on the collocated server. Afterwards the users of our services submit their own personal 
passwords and ID’s in order to get connected to the server and attend the lessons through the Internet. 
Competitive advantages of such business model for providing distance-learning services comparing to the 
conventional syllabus are: i) the absence of traditional classrooms which leads to reduced Operating Costs, 
ii) the absence of traditional way of teaching which reinforces autonomous learning, iii) offering services 
24h a day, 7days a week that leads to maximum exploitation while at the same time it is more convenient 
for the users, iv) flexible pace of attending the lessons, and v) reduced fees due to the continuous 
functioning and the reduced operating costs. 
From PU e-services perspective a decision to enter the e-learning business can be a matter of timing. 
Particularly, it is examined whether PU can afford to wait or should move rabidly sacrificing uncertainties’ 
control in order not lose part or even more overall of the business value (monopoly case for the 
competitor). By waiting, PU expects that uncertainties, related to the acceptance of e-learning services in 
the specific market and the organizational capabilities of it, would be resolved. By waiting, PU could learn 
more about the potential returns on such investments. For example, the acceptance rate for such services 
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might increase as customers become more aware of these services. In parallel, PU could take actions to 
lower its market entry risk (e.g. by seeking corporate alliances for common exploitation of the specific 
market). With these concerns in mind PU is addressed to the question: how long should PU wait to enter 
the e-learning market? A two players’ game is considered where one player is PU and the other player is a 
competitive private educational organization on a national level. The decision making process has to find 
the balance between investing now or wait till the moment where the business value is higher than its 
expected value in the future up to the time moment where the investment is still available to the PU. 
During the waiting period, some of the decision factors may change and even if some of them are perfectly 
predictable the decision maker has to estimate the pros and cons of an early or late decision.  
As mentioned before, it is more profitable for the PU to offer higher level of e-learning services, being able 
to charge it with higher price than its competitor. Also the optimum time to enter the market is defined by 
the expected customers demand level where the expected ENPV is the higher possible. Concerning the 
quality attributes, the analysis focuses on one dimension perspective, while it may be a subject of further 
work to consider multi-attribute analysis. In general the most important ICT service attributes could be 
reliability, fit for purpose and keeping promises to the customers. Especially, regarding the e-learning 
services provision by institutions the demand for quality and accountability is continuously increasing. In 
overall, the factors constitute the online learning are as follows (MacLeod 2002, Alley & Jansak 2001, 
McLoughlin & Visser 2003): 
 Engage students in active, experiential learning. 
 Build and sustain motivation by providing prompt and regular feedback. 
 Make expectations explicit and cultivate self-directed learners. 
 Provide interaction with others which allows negotiation and construction of knowledge. 
 Provide activities that allow for practice of new skills and foster transfer of new knowledge. 
 Allow time and space for reflection on learning. 
 Balance individual and collaborative tasks for learning so that interpersonal and social elements are well 
integrated. 
 Align assessment processes with learning outcomes. 
 Provide accessible and structured support for student learning. 
 Ensure that teacher-student and student-student interaction are provided. 
In particular, the quality attribute may be composed by a number of the aforementioned criteria and so 
defined as a vector of such factors. 
5 DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The ICT industry is one of the most capital intensive among the high-technology industries. ICT business 
analysis, especially after the industry deregulation, has become a difficult task. ICT investments contain 
uncertainties concerning, demand, technology, organizational, financial and environmental aspects.  
Traditional quantitative cost-benefit analysis concerning investment decisions is by no means sufficient for 
capturing the complexity of the problem in its entirety. In addition, ICT businesses contain growth aspects 
modeled by staged evolution, while each growth stage may experience different competition 
characteristics. Especially, the ICT competition is mainly related to the oligopoly conditions where there are 
only few players and game theory is suitable for modeling these conditions.  
So far in the ICT literature competition modeling by GT and ROs does not contain multi-period analysis. The 
proposed model addresses the research question of “when and how much to offer” for a service (product) 
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in the ICT market. ICT products can be mainly characterized by high fixed infrastructure costs and very low 
variable costs. Normally, fixed costs are sunk costs, not recoverable, if business fails. Also, some of ICT 
business fields may experience significant capacity constraints such as broadband backbone network, while 
in some other ICT fields not so significant such as e-learning activities and more generally information 
services. Price competition rationally leads to products differentiation for avoidance of intense price 
competition. In addition, uncertainties control proposes the adoption of the ROs as already proposed in the 
ICT literature (Angelou and Economides, 2009; Mun, 2002; Trigeorgis 1996).  
In the light of the aforementioned characteristics and research proposals, this study provides a multi-period 
price competition model for ICT business activities. For each period of the overall business game the 
competitors watch and analyze the overall market demand and recognize the market size as well as the 
optimum entry point for them. According to the market demand there may be space for one, for two, or for 
none of the players to enter the market. Also a case study is, intuitively, discussed regarding a public 
university as an interest business investor to enter the e-learning business field. 
Most ICT industries exhibit network effects. Angelou and Economides (2009) discussed network effects 
under qualitative thinking in the basis of ROs and game theory integration. Network effects concern both 
sequential and simultaneous decision modes. In a market where ‘tipping’ effects are strong (e.g., computer 
software market, satellite broadcasting market) the first firm to establish a base tends to dominate the 
whole market in due course. In addition, in some instances a firm’s investment project has higher value if 
another firm also invests; in this case the investments of the two firms are said to be complementary. For 
example, as long as competitive effects are not too strong, a firm may benefit from the advertising 
expenditure of other firms to the extent that this creates demand for the product class as a whole, not just 
the output of the particular producer. Finally, simultaneous investment may involve strategic alliances 
benefits which may include the allocation of complementary resources from all parties. If both players act 
(invest) simultaneously they can achieve an aggressive market entry. Someone may examine in a 
quantitative way all these aspects and how they can influence the decision equilibrium of the proposed 
analysis. Another, extension of the analysis could be the assumption that in the first period, only low 
quality of investment is possible, while in the second period, both high and low quality investment is 
available. Furthermore, investment cost can be lower for the second period (Demirhan et. al. 2006, 
Demirhan et. al. 2007). Also, this study could include a multi-criteria analysis taking into account both 
quantitative and qualitative factors. In addition, future research could examine more players in the market, 
which is more realistic in the new era of the telecommunication markets. Finally, a real life case study could 
prove the real applicability of the proposed analysis. 
6 CONCLUSION  
The quantitative game theoretic analysis is already well known for single business, and extended analysis of 
basic price and quantity competition games is already present in the basic industrial organization literature. 
However, this paper adds in the overall competition modeling dimension beyond that by introducing a 
multi-period competition perspective by integrating ROs and game theory analysis. In addition, it is the first 
time where ROs and game theory are integrated in the e-learning field under price competition modeling.  
It examines the two players’ game (duopoly case). Duopoly provides a starting point for research 
investigating strategic impacts of ICT investments. Particularly, in telecommunication markets there are 
normally two or three strong players and a number of weaker players that normally follow the strong ones. 
One perspective of our analysis could be the case where the game concerns two parties, one is the firm of 
interest and the other is the rest of the competition as one entity. Finally, a case study, from e-learning 
business field, is intuitively examined showing how the model can be formulated.  
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Appendix  
Price competition analysis   
The business opportunity is available only for one period. Particular, if one competitor invests and the other 
does not invest there are monopoly conditions. If both invest at t=0 there are simultaneous decisions, while 
if none of them invests there is no business at all. 
We consider the following time order of events (actions) and decisions. First, the firms decide to invest in 
the business field where price competition will take place. Second, service (product) quality attributes are 
chosen by the players. Finally, each firm chooses its price to maximize its respective profits. We focus in the 
broadband market and especially the bandwidth provision. We assume that customers prefer higher 
bandwidth, however they vary in their willingness to pay for it.  The notations used in the analysis are given 
in Table A-1.  
 
Notation Definition  
D Customers demand at time period t 
dnD Decrease of demand moving down by dn 
(binominal process) at time period t+1 
upD Increase of demand moving up by up (binominal 
process) at time period t+1 
DiM Customers demand threshold for monopoly case (i=A,B) 
DiHQL Customers demand threshold for high quality case  
DiLQL Customers demand threshold for low quality case  
l Lower index of customers type of the market being interest to by 
service (product) with specific quality attributes  
h Higher index of customers type of the market being interest to by 
service (product) with specific quality attributes  
N Number of customers for each customer type.  
NPV Net Present Value of business opportunity where 
no ROV exists (No ROV)  
ENPV Expanded Net Present Value of business 
opportunity which contains the ROV 
ROVM Real option value (ROV) of business opportunity 
for monopoly case  
ROVHQL Real option value (ROV) of business opportunity 
for high quality service  
ROVLQL Real option value (ROV) of business opportunity 
for low quality service  
INi Invest for player i (i=A,B) under monopoly 
conditions  
DFi Defer for player i (i=A,B) under monopoly 
conditions  
INiLQL Invest for player i (i=A,B) with low quality  
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DFiHQL Defer for player i (i=A,B) with high quality  
DFiLQL Defer for player i (i=A,B) with low quality  
Io Business infrastructure cost (one-time cost) at the time period t 
I Business infrastructure cost (one-time cost) at the time period 
t+1 
r Discount factor 
π The expected revenues from business opportunity (πM monopoly 
case) 
C The overall operational cost function  
k The coefficient of the development cost 
c Marginal cost of service/product offer 
t Type of consumers 
tk Type of consumers that that are indifferent between products 
(u1,u2) 
p Price of product/service offered 
u Quality of product/service offered (uM monopoly case) 
u1 Service quality charged with p1 
u2 Service quality charged with p2 
σ Demand volatility  
Ut customer Customers’ overall utility  
ω Coefficient factor that is related the service (product) value for 
the customer 
Table A-1: Notations Used in our Model 
We index the customers’ types with the variable t. We consider that t is uniformly distributed over the 
interval [l,h], where h>l>0. Customers with t=h have the higher interest in the service (product), while with 
t=l have the less interest in the product. The density of customers is N per unit of the type index. Hence, the 
total number of customers (overall market size) is N(h-l). Customers choose to buy the services if their 
utility (or net value) is positive. Particularly, we define the utility value for customer t for product with 
attribute u (u>0) at the price p to be the difference between the value of this (i.e. quality in our case) and 
the price p that the customer pays.  
putVputU tcustoemer ,,,                 (A-1) 
Where  
0  ,0
t
V
u
V
 
We use a specific function for utility in order to discuss on specific results proposed by Zhu (1999).  
putp,u,tUtcustomer                   (A-2) 
The type t customer will buy the product if the utility value is positive  
u
p
to
 
Since all customers in [to,h] will choose to buy the product, the total demand, D, is  
u/phND                               (A-3) 
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We assume that the marginal cost of producing each unit (e.g a new student enrolment) is c. The 
development cost is ku2. Hence, the overall cost function C is  
cDkuD,uC 2             (A-4) 
where k may be the coefficient of the development cost. It is related to the technology used to develop the 
service (product). Particularly, for e-learning software products, k is related to the programming platform 
for the application development as well as to the personnel cost development. The quadratic term 
represent that the marginal development cost increases as the quality of the service (product) increases. 
The time order of events is as following. First, the competitors pay an investment cost in entering the e-
learning market, then they choose the qualities (attributes) of their respective service (product) and then 
they compete in the price domain. The competitors choose whether or not to make a fixed, irreversible 
investment to enter the market. At the end of this choice, each competitor recognizes his competitors, 
which have entered and which have not. Second, each competitor chooses the quality attribute per 
enrolment type (e.g. business English, academic English, engineering English). Higher bit rate requires 
higher investment (development) installation cost. Finally having looked the competitor’s service 
attributes, each firm chooses its price for optimizing its business utility. 
 
Monopoly competition 
In case of a monopoly, we consider that firm decides the product quality u and the price p having in mind to 
maximize the business profit π.  
 22
p,u
ku
u
p
hNcpkuDcpD,uCD.pMax
1
                        (A-5) 
For simplicity, without loss of generality, we assume c=0 and the solution of the optimization problem is  
k64
hN
01222,0  π,
k16
Nh
p  ,
k8
Nh
u
242
M
23
M
2
M
 
 
Duopoly competition  
The competition model, to be analyzed, corresponds to two firms entering a new market, while there is no 
prior leader. To find the game equilibrium, we first start with the final choice of the price selection, 
considering that each player knows the decision of his competitor and the attributes of his products. First, 
the two competitors simultaneously choose service (product) attribute (e.g. bandwidth provision). Then 
each competitor, having recognized the other firm’s choice, simultaneously chooses a price for its product. 
More clearly, the prices are chosen after service (product) attributes choice, because the prices can be 
changed more readily (Zhu, 1999).  
We consider two products on the market, with bandwidth and price (u1,p1) and (u2,p2) respectively. We also 
consider that u2>u1. Customer t will buy product i if  
0ptu iii and jjjiii ptuptu , where i#j 
If tk is the type of customers that are indifferent between product (u1,p1) and (u2,p2), then 
2k2ik1 ptuptu  
Hence,  
12
12
k
uu
pp
t , where tk>0 
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The customers are grouped into three parts: h,t,t,
u
p
,
u
p
,l kk
1
1
1
1  where customers buy nothing, buy 
product u1, and buy product u2 respectively.  
Given u1 and u2, both competitors try to maximize their profits by determining specific prices for their 
products.  
2
1
1
1
k1111111
p
u.k
u
p
tN.pd,ucq.pMax
1
 (A-16) 
2
2k2222222
p
u.kthN.pd,ucq.pMax
2
   (A-17) 
The solution of the optimization problem provides 
12
121
1
4 uu
uuuh
popt  and 
12
122
2
4
2
uu
uuuh
popt
 
So, the competitor with the higher product quality is able to set a higher price.  
Working backwards, we solve the second phase of the game. Each firm sets its product quality level in 
order to maximize its profit.  
                                 2
1
1
1
k
opt
11
u
u.k
u
p
tN.pMax
1
  ,   2
2k
opt
22
u
u.kthN.pMax
2
                 (A-18) 
Taking values for the optimum prices for both players and having  
0
i
i
u  We have the following equations: 
0uu4ku2u7u4uNh
3
12112
2
2
2
, 0uu4ku4uu3u2Nh2
3
12
2
221
2
1
2            (A-19) 
Solving these equations and using the afore mentioned also equations we find the equilibrium prices, 
qualities (service attribute), and profits for the two competitors, which are respectively, 
k
hN
000764,0  π,
k
Nh
00513,0p  ,
k
Nh
02412.0u
242
opt
1
23
opt
1
2
opt
1
 
k
hN
01222,0  π,
k
Nh
05383,0p  ,
k
Nh
12666.0u
242
opt
2
23
opt
2
2
opt
2
 
Finally, it can easily be estimated NbNbbbtk 525.0q and  ,2625.0q  ,213,0  t,475.0
opt
2
opt
11 indicating that the 
two competitors would support 78.75% of the overall market. As seen in the present analysis the two 
competitors choose different qualities because if they choose the same service attribute (quality) 
bandwidth, they compete strictly on price and price will fall to marginal cost, which for telecommunication 
services goods is almost zero, so fail to recover their development, sunk, irreversible costs 0.  
In the last phase of the game we consider the decision whether to make the initial investment to initiate 
business activity and enter the market.  
Demand zones analysis and decision mode for a single period analysis.   
The equilibriums to make investment and exercise the business option are defined by the market demand 
thresholds that make investment profitable (i.e. NPV=π-Ι>0).  
 ,
ω
I
k1309hN if ,IN,IN 2
42
iLQLiLQL
 ,Ik1309hNI82k if ,Ι,DF 2422iHQLHQLi  
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,Ik64hN if ,DF,DF 2
42
ii
 
2
42
2iiii
Ik82 hNI64k if ,IN,DFor  DF,INstrategy  mixed  
where I is the investment (infrastructure) cost for players, Figure A-1.  
 
Figure A-1. Demand regions analysis of one-period game 
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